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I. INTRODUCTION 
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’s The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property1 has been thoroughly mined by scholars and used to 
support numerous theses,2 yet it still provides a rich source for considera-
tion. Corporate legal theory has not yet determined how best to treat the 
issue of separation of ownership and control or fully resolved “who 
should receive the profits of industry.”3 Berle’s belief that corporate 
powers should be exercised in trust for shareholders has had limited trac-
tion, but his ideas continue to influence debate. This Article takes Berle’s 
statement that “when a convincing system of community obligations is 
worked out . . . the passive property right of today must yield before the 
larger interests of society”4 to argue for the creation of social businesses. 
Social businesses are entities that are profit-making, but not profit-
maximizing—non-loss, non-dividend firms dedicated to serving a social 
goal. Just as The Modern Corporation was, in part, a response to the po-
litical and economic times in which it was written, our current economic 
struggles and the wrath directed at corporate communities provide an 
opportunity to consider alternatives to current business models and to 
think about how we might expand our view of the role and purpose 
served by business entities by encouraging social ventures. Such an ex-
pansion will benefit not only the populations reached by businesses’ ac-
tivities, but also the perception of business itself. 
Some may doubt that social businesses can be created and main-
tained. After explaining the concept of social businesses and why Berle 
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might have supported their creation, I will suggest legal frameworks that 
could accommodate them and discuss several social businesses currently 
in operation in Bangladesh. By no means do I suggest that all businesses 
should operate in the social business form. I argue instead that there is 
room for both traditional profit-maximizing firms and social businesses 
in the corporate lexicon, and that the addition of social businesses will 
greatly enrich the landscape. Berle was prescient in noting, “[B]usiness 
practice is increasingly assuming the aspect of economic statesman-
ship.”5 Business entities play a critical role in society, beyond their eco-
nomic impact. Social businesses allow the “social” aspect of the social 
science of economics to regain credibility in the conversation about the 
function of business. 
II: WHAT SOCIAL BUSINESSES ARE AND WHY BERLE MIGHT HAVE 
ENCOURAGED THEIR CREATION 
It may seem antithetical to suggest that Berle, long associated with 
the concept of shareholder primacy, might support a form of business 
entity that does not care about maximizing returns to shareholders. But 
Berle cared a great deal about the power exercised by firms and the ac-
companying responsibility. Recognizing the growth of public corpora-
tions and the separation of ownership and control that occurred in the 
“quasi-public” corporate form, he argued that such entities owed “[n]ew 
responsibilities towards the owners, the workers, the consumers, and the 
State . . . .”6 
Proponents of social businesses make similar arguments. Corpora-
tions have become dominant economic actors at every level of our socie-
ty. Social businesses are a means to harness the power of the corporate 
form and use it to further societal welfare, a notion perfectly in keeping 
with Berle’s viewpoint. Also, the creation of social businesses is a reac-
tion to changing economic and social times, just as Berle’s understanding 
of the structure and function of the corporate form depended on an un-
derstanding of the historical and temporal context in which he wrote. 
The idea that businesses should operate not just to make money but 
also to address social concerns is gaining traction around the globe. A 
2000 Business Week/Harris poll asked Americans which of the follow-
ing statements they supported: (1) corporations should have only one 
purpose, to make the most profit for their shareholders, and the pursuit of 
that goal will be best for America in the long run; or (2) corporations 
should sometimes sacrifice some profit for the sake of making things 
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better for their workers and the communities in which they operate?7 Ni-
nety-five percent of the respondents selected the second option.8 
Leading business people are recognizing society’s desire to have 
businesses do more than maximize profits. The book, Creative Capital-
ism: A Conversation with Bill Gates, Warren Buffet and Other Economic 
Leaders is one prominent example of the groundswell of interest in this 
idea.9 The book is a compilation of essays and commentary on capital-
ism, philanthropy, and global development that takes as its starting point 
a speech Bill Gates delivered at the World Economic Forum in Davos.10 
In that speech, Gates acknowledged that many of the world’s problems 
are too big for philanthropy—even on the scale of the Gates Founda-
tion—and that free-market capitalism would need to help solve them.11 
In the same compilation, Ed Glaeser notes, “[I]f more corporations are 
going to be ‘creative,’ then we surely need to consider new contractual 
forms that reflect the fact that firms may want to do other things in addi-
tion to making money for their shareholders.”12 This is both an acknowl-
edgment of the power of business to address social needs and recognition 
of the prevailing strength of Berle’s emphasis on shareholder primacy. 
To be sure, many established businesses currently participate in 
programs designed to address global social problems. One of many is 
(RED), a project that works with major companies including, among oth-
ers, Nike, Starbucks, and Dell to make unique branded products and do-
nates fifty percent of the proceeds from these products to the Global 
Fund to invest in HIV and AIDS programs in Africa.13 
Other ventures try to adopt a hybrid model under which a for-profit 
company also runs (and finances) a related nonprofit venture. Yet anoth-
er model alters the traditional foundation model (which limits the type of 
investments foundations can make)14 by joining for-profit and nonprofit 
investing. The Omidyar Network is a prominent example of such a hybr-
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id fund. Omidyar is an organization started by eBay founder Pierre Omi-
dyar that “has completely abandoned the traditional foundation structure 
[to fund] both for-profits and non-profit projects that will add up to social 
good and market-rate returns”15 and is “dedicated to harnessing the pow-
er of markets to create opportunity for people to improve their lives.”16 It 
consists of a 501(c)(3) and a limited liability company, using the LLC to 
invest in for-profit entities and the 501(c)(3) to make grants. Omidyar 
Network’s work is based on the belief that “business can create extraor-
dinary opportunity and value, and that market-based solutions can gener-
ate significant social returns.”17 
By advocating for the creation of social business, I am not suggest-
ing that these types of programs and hybrid ventures be discontinued. 
Their efforts contribute great value and make real differences; however, 
it should be acknowledged that, while the relatively rare large and well-
funded ventures of this type may enjoy long-term success, in other cases 
the hybrid model is not ideal. 
“This conjoined structure really has problems . . . . Embedded in it 
is an inherent risk that individuals are profiting from donations that 
were made for public benefit. . . .” On occasion, the need to gener-
ate returns for investors overwhelms the social mission. In other 
cases, the business falters altogether and cannot support the non-
profit.18 
Whenever the nonprofit, socially motivated component of an enterprise 
is in any way dependent upon the for-profit component, potential prob-
lems lurk due to the tension between the dual goals of profit-making 
(maximizing) and advancing social welfare. 
Social businesses are different in important ways from these ap-
proaches that try to harness the power of business to advance social wel-
fare. The idea of a social business was first conceptualized by Moham-
mad Yunus, the founder of the Grameen Bank (the Bank) and the winner 
of the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize—together with the Bank—for his pio-
neering work in microcredit.19 A social business, as conceived by Profes-
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sor Yunus, is part of the burgeoning field of social entrepreneurship20 but 
has a very precise, narrow definition.21 To qualify as a social business, an 
entity must engage in ordinary, viable business enterprise. It must identi-
fy and fill a market need for goods or services. Unlike a traditional busi-
ness, however, a social business must be created and run for the express 
purpose of pursing specific, articulated social goals, rather than maximiz-
ing profit.22 It must, at a minimum, cover its costs and will ideally gener-
ate profits. A social business competes in the marketplace with other so-
cial and traditional, profit-maximizing ventures. It is completely self-
sufficient, not dependent on grants or donations for its daily operations. 
It is in all respects a typical business, except that instead of providing 
returns to its shareholders, it uses what would have gone to shareholders 
to further societal welfare. Investors receive back the amount of their 
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role it now plays in development and poverty alleviation came in 2006 when Mohammad Yunus and 
the Grameen Bank were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize “for their efforts to create social and eco-
nomic development from below.” NOBELPRIZE.ORG, supra note 19. 
 22. Although there are similarities between them, social businesses differ from social entrepre-
neurship. Social entrepreneurship is driven by an individual or individuals and may take any number 
of forms. A social business is a very precise business model—a non-loss, nonprofit company with a 
social objective. Thus, a social entrepreneur may start a social business, but the concepts are distinct. 
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original investment, enabling them to reinvest in another such venture, 
but receive no other economic return from the social business. 
Social businesses in general may take one of two forms, although 
each must fulfill the requirements detailed above. The first, a “Type I” 
social business, is started by its investors to address a specific social con-
cern and reinvests all of its profits in expanding the business to better 
address that concern. Examples of Type I social businesses (discussed in 
greater detail below) include enterprises such as a water treatment and 
delivery operation that provides potable water to otherwise underserved 
areas and a yogurt factory that makes a product that provides nutritional 
value to populations facing malnutrition issues. A “Type II” social busi-
ness is a profit-making company owned by poor or otherwise disadvan-
taged people, either directly or through a holding entity. The profits of a 
Type II social business may be used to benefit both the employees of the 
entity and the community in which it is located. Examples of Type II 
social businesses include a fisheries operation that employs individuals 
who would otherwise not be able to find work. 
The critical difference between a social business (whether Type I or 
Type II) and a traditional business lies not in the business model used, 
but in the goals pursued. Unlike a traditional business, any profit gener-
ated by a social business must be used (after repayment to its investors of 
their original investment) to further the enterprise and its social goals.23 
A social business thus eliminates the profit-maximization goal of tradi-
tional enterprises and instead focuses on benefit maximization. This 
clearly presents difficult governance issues, but those issues differ from 
those identified by Berle in important ways. 
First, a social business requires that traditional corporate fiduciary 
duty analysis be reconsidered. Shareholder primacy cannot be the driving 
force behind directorial action. The concern that Berle voiced that “[t]he 
stockholder is therefore left as a matter of law with little more than the 
loose expectation that a group of men, under a nominal duty to run the 
enterprise for his benefit, and that of others like him, will actually ob-
serve this obligation”24 is removed. Stockholders in a social business 
cannot expect directors to run the enterprise for their benefit because 
they become shareholders knowing that this is not the case. 
Furthermore, the problems associated with the separation of owner-
ship and control that so troubled Berle are not the same in a social busi-
ness. While there clearly are “owners” of a social business in that shares 
are sold (and eventually may be traded if the long-term goal of a social 
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stock market is realized), the interests of such owners are very different 
from the interests of owners of a traditional business. Because all of the 
profits of a social business go towards furthering the goals of that busi-
ness, investors in a social business tend to invest because they support 
the goals of the enterprise, not for personal enrichment. While the lack of 
a personal profit motive on the part of shareholders does not eliminate 
the governance issues of a social business, it does significantly reduce 
them by aligning the interest of managers and owners more closely. 
Managers will be rewarded for operating a business that successfully 
advances the social goals valued by its owners. 
Acknowledging that the concept of shareholder primacy vanishes 
with the creation of a social business raises the question of why anyone 
would invest in a social business. Skeptics may believe that no rational 
individual or entity would ever choose to invest in such an entity because 
that investment offers no more economic return than a return of the orig-
inal amount invested. With limited investment funds, why would any 
person or company elect an investment with no potential upside when 
there are other possibilities available that offer the chance of superior 
investment returns? 
Several reasons underlie the decision to invest in a social business. 
On an individual level, an investor’s personal identification with and 
support for the social goals of the business provide strong incentive to 
become involved. Further, many individuals have a strong impulse to 
give to “worthy” causes—demonstrated by the $303.75 billion given as 
charitable donations in the United States in 2009.25 “Giving” the money 
to a social business in the form of an investment in a social business is a 
preferable method of supporting desired goals because the monies in-
vested this way are not simply “given” but are returned to the investor, 
who can then use that capital again (ideally to invest in another social 
business!). Social business investing does not need to replace charitable 
giving, but can serve as another outlet for those wishing to use their capi-
tal to further social good. 
Companies also have incentives to invest in social businesses. So-
cial ventures can provide important access to markets, which companies 
can then capitalize on with their profit-maximizing operations. There is a 
large and as yet mostly untapped market at the “bottom of the pyra-
                                                 
 25. See Charitable Giving Fell 3.6 Percent in 2009, ‘Giving USA’ Finds, PHILANTHROPY 
NEWS DIGEST (June 20, 2010), http://foundationcenter.org/pnd/news/story.jhtml?id=296700002. 
This amount reflects a 3.6% decline from prior years—not surprising given the state of the economy 
in 2009. See id. 
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mid.”26 If a social business serves that market, a participant in that ven-
ture may gain access to populations it otherwise would have difficulty 
reaching.27 Additionally, companies may recognize that a social business 
can provide them with useful research and development opportunities. 
Social businesses allow experimentation and exploration free from the 
constraints of a traditional, profit-maximizing model. Results of such 
efforts may produce outcomes that can be transferred to other markets. 
Finally, a venture that is operating as a nonprofit may choose to invest in 
a social business so that it may begin to operate on a for-profit basis and 
thereby escape continued reliance on grants and donations for survival. 
In sum, while there are many challenges to encouraging investment 
in a social business, the same can be said for encouraging investment in 
any venture. There are rational incentives for such investment, and skep-
ticism should not prevent progress in the creation of companies intended 
to further social good. 
III. IS THE CREATION OF SOCIAL BUSINESSES POSSIBLE UNDER 
CURRENT U.S. LAW? 
I have argued elsewhere that U.S. corporate law, with its emphasis 
on shareholder primacy, does not at present easily lend itself to the crea-
tion of social businesses.28 This should not deter us from seeking to har-
ness the power of capitalism to achieve social good. Just as Berle recog-
nized that the traditional conceptions of property that formed the basis 
for U.S. corporate law had ceased to be accurate and that “[n]ew terms, 
connoting changed relationships [had] become necessary,”29 so too is it 
now time to expand our understanding of the purposes and functions that 
business entities may play. Surely not every venture can or should be a 
social business, but there is room in the marketplace for this business 
model. As corporations gained in size and influence, Berle acknowl-
edged their increasing importance on the economic, social, and political 
scenes of his time. Now there is growing recognition that governments 
and charities alone cannot solve the serious social problems facing our 
society and that the power of corporations should be brought to bear 
                                                 
 26. See generally C.K. PRAHALAD, THE FORTUNE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PYRAMID (2006) 
(discussing the wisdom of targeting the “poorest of the poor”). 
 27. The desire to reach untapped markets was one of the incentives that caused Groupe Danone 
to enter into a social business in Bangladesh. See infra Part IV.A. In fact, skeptics suggest that this 
may be the driving motive behind entry into such ventures by large, profit-driven corporations. 
While motivations are difficult to discern, the bottom line is that the social business was created and 
the social needs are being met. As long as the result is achieved, does it matter why it happened? 
 28. Celia R. Taylor, Carpe Crisis: Capitalizing on the Breakdown of Capitalism to Consider 
the Creation of Social Businesses, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 743 (2009/2010). 
 29. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 303. 
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upon them.30 With this perspective in mind, let us consider what steps 
could be taken to encourage the growth of a social business sector. 
There are several scenarios under which social businesses could be-
gin to flourish. One approach simply uses existing “uncorporation”31 
forms. Another relies on the creation of a new business entity—either a 
“B Corporation” or the LC3, a low-profit LLC. These possibilities are 
discussed below. 
A. Uncorporation Forms of Business Entities: Limited Partnerships and 
Limited Liability Companies 
The prevailing emphasis in U.S. corporate law on shareholder pri-
macy makes the traditional corporate form a poor entity choice under 
which to attempt to organize and operate a social business, due to the 
fiduciary duty concerns this emphasis places on corporate directors. The 
ordinary corporate model simply does not accommodate the functions of 
a social business whose very purpose is not to maximize wealth, but to 
enhance social good. While the ability of corporations to engage in so-
cially directed action (including making charitable donations) is now 
widely accepted, such actions are still subject to fiduciary duty limita-
tions. 
But what of other types of business entities? Just as the ways of 
conducting business had evolved and developed when Berle was writing 
The Modern Corporation, so too have dramatic changes occurred in the 
models of business entities now available for entrepreneurs to consider. 
Most important among these changes is the growth in the use of the un-
corporation model, including limited partnerships (LPs) and limited lia-
bility companies (LLCs). 
Uncorporations offer to organizers of social businesses advantages 
not available under traditional corporate law. Most importantly, under 
Delaware law (and the law of at least ten other jurisdictions), organizers 
of uncorporations can contractually limit or eliminate fiduciary duties,32 
                                                 
 30. See, e.g., CREATIVE CAPITALISM, supra note 9; YUNUS, supra note 23, at 3–19. 
 31. This term is credited to Larry Ribstein, who writes widely on the subject. See, e.g., Larry E. 
Ribstein, The Uncorporation and Corporate Indeterminacy, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 131. 
 32. The LP version (the LLC version is substantively the same) provides: 
(d) To the extent that, at law or in equity, a partner or other person has duties (including 
fiduciary duties) to a limited partnership or to another partner or to another person that is 
a party to or is otherwise bound by a partnership agreement, the partner’s or other per-
son’s duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the partnership 
agreement; provided that the partnership agreement may not eliminate the implied con-
tractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
(e) Unless otherwise provided in a partnership agreement, a partner or other person shall 
not be liable to a limited partnership or to another partner or to another person that is a 
party to or is otherwise bound by a partnership agreement for breach of fiduciary duty for 
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subject only to the prohibition that the charter documents for such enti-
ties “may not limit or eliminate liability for any act or omission that con-
stitutes a bad faith violation of the implied contractual covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing.”33 Rather than relying on default rules of fiduciary 
obligation, the parties in an uncorporation do the work themselves by 
fashioning contracts (charter documents) that provide the discipline and 
incentives that corporations expect from fiduciaries. 
Uncorporations’ ability to eliminate or restrict fiduciary duties does 
not exist in laws governing corporations, which typically limit waivers of 
the duty of care by retaining a good faith qualifier.34 This ability gives 
organizers of uncorporations the opportunity to carefully draft organiza-
tional documents to create social businesses that do not seek to maximize 
shareholder welfare. If the charter documents of the entity are explicit in 
the purpose and functioning of the entity and make it clear that no return 
over the original investment will be due to shareholders, those contrac-
tual terms should prevail over claims that directors must always maxim-
ize profits. 
In a 2003 speech, Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Myron T. 
Steele endorsed the view that contractual terms explicitly stating mana-
gerial obligation in an uncorporation context should take precedence 
over corporate fiduciary duties.35 In that speech, Chief Justice Steele 
stated that when dealing with uncorporations, courts should begin their 
analysis by looking to the parties’ agreement and applying a contractual 
analysis rather than analogizing to traditional notions of corporate gover-
nance.36 The default good faith provision found in the relevant uncorpo-
ration acts should be considered only when it is clear that the parties 
                                                                                                             
the partner’s or other person’s good faith reliance on the provisions of the partnership 
agreement. 
(f) A partnership agreement may provide for the limitation or elimination of any and all 
liabilities for breach of contract and breach of duties (including fiduciary duties) of a 
partner or other person to a limited partnership or to another partner or to an other person 
that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a partnership agreement; provided that a part-
nership agreement may not limit or eliminate liability for any act or omission that consti-
tutes a bad faith violation of the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing. 
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(2011). 
 33. Id. § 17-1101(f) (applying to LPs); id. § 18-1101(e) (applying to LLCs). At least thirteen 
other state LLC statutes provide for waiver of fiduciary duties without specific restrictions. See 
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANIES § 9 apps. 9-6 (2d ed. Supp. 2009). 
 34. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §102(b)(7) (2011). 
 35. Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships 
and Limited Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2007). 
 36. Id. at 1. 
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“would have agreed to proscribe the act later complained of . . . had they 
thought to negotiate with respect to that matter . . . .”37 
Assuming that the organizational documents for a social business 
are drafted clearly, investors in that business should be aware of the pur-
pose of the entity when they make their investment; because they know 
that shareholder primacy will not be the driving purpose of the venture, 
they will not be able to argue that nonprofit maximization would have 
been proscribed. Thus, the default good faith requirement of the relevant 
uncorporation legislation (typically demanding no bad faith deviation 
from an implied contractual obligation of good faith) would not be im-
plicated. 
Founders of an uncorporation designed to operate a social business 
will need to exercise great care in drafting their organizational docu-
ments, but there is some guidance from the courts as to how fiduciary 
carveouts may be interpreted. In Miller v. American Real Estate Part-
ners, Vice Chancellor Strine explained what factors the Delaware courts 
will consider when determining whether the organizers of an uncorpora-
tion intended to waive default fiduciary duties.38 Although the court ap-
plied default fiduciary duties, it emphasized the importance of the 
agreement: 
The DRULPA puts investors on notice that fiduciary duties may be 
altered by partnership agreements, and therefore that investors 
should be careful to read partnership agreements before buying 
units. In large measure, the DRULPA reflects the doctrine of caveat 
emptor, as is fitting given that investors in limited partnerships have 
countless other investment opportunities available to them that in-
volve less risk and/or more legal protection. For example, any in-
vestor who wishes to retain the protection of traditional fiduciary 
duties can always invest in corporate stock.39 
The court also emphasized that 
just as investors must use due care, so must the drafter of a partner-
ship agreement who wishes to supplant the operation of traditional 
fiduciary duties. In view of the great freedom afforded to such draf-
ters and the reality that most publicly traded limited partnerships are 
governed by agreements drafted exclusively by the original general 
partner, it is fair to expect that restrictions on fiduciary duties be set 
                                                 
 37. Id. at 17 (quoting Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 880 (Del. Ch. 1986)). See gener-
ally, Ribstein, supra note 31 (discussing Delaware cases applying this principle to permit waiver of 
fiduciary duties in LPs and LLCs). 
 38. Miller v. Am. Real Estate Partners, No. CIV.A.16788, 2001 WL 1045643, at *7 (Del. Ch. 
Sept. 7, 2001). 
 39. Id. at *8 (footnote omitted). 
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forth clearly and unambiguously. A topic as important as this should 
not be addressed coyly.40 
Miller thus indicates that generally in uncorporation cases in Dela-
ware, an explicit agreement will be enforced according to its terms.41 
While the courts have not suggested specific language, they have indi-
cated that explicit, unambiguous terms removing (or reducing) traditional 
fiduciary duties will be honored. As noted by Chief Justice Steele, Dela-
ware law “leaves little, if any, room for argument over whether the con-
tract relationship has triumphed over the status relationship in Delaware 
limited partnership and limited liability company internal governance 
scrutiny.”42 
To the extent that the agreement does not explicitly exclude default 
duties, the court will apply such duties unless they cannot be reconciled 
with the terms of the agreement. Organizers of uncorporations intended 
to be operated as social businesses can use this guidance to carefully de-
lineate the rights and expectations of investors at the outset and thereby 
avoid application of the traditional fiduciary duties that are implicated by 
shareholder primacy. 
The uncorporation business form presents great opportunities for 
people organizing businesses with explicit social goals. At this stage of 
development, however, there are still impediments. Uncorporations 
formed to operate as social businesses would receive no tax advantage 
and therefore might not be as attractive an investment vehicle for social 
contributors. Further, although several jurisdictions allow the elimination 
of fiduciary duties through contract in uncorporations, not all follow that 
approach, creating some uncertainty as to the full extent of protection 
afforded. Additionally, even in a jurisdiction whose law permits contrac-
tual limitations on fiduciary duties, complete elimination in the manner 
suggested above has yet to be tried and is, therefore, untested. Finally, 
the uncorporate regime was not crafted with the intent to allow business-
es to actively advance social good. While the model may be flexible 
enough to accommodate such ventures, there might be problems signal-
ing and identifying the goals and mission of any particular uncorpora-
tion. Clarity in the marketplace is important; therefore, a traditional un-
corporate entity may not be the best alternative to use when organizing a 
business with the purpose of advancing social good. 
                                                 
 40. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 41. Id. at *7–12. 
 42. Steele, supra note 35, at 14. 
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B. Other Entity Choices 
Some proponents of an expanding role for business entities in ad-
vancing social good recognize the problems discussed above. Rather than 
work within existing and confining legal regimes, these proponents ad-
vocate the creation of new legal forms that would perhaps better serve 
their goals. Two such entities that have generated significant attention 
are the B Corporation and the LC3, each of which is discussed below. 
1. B Corporations 
B Corporations (“B” stands for benefit or beneficial) were original-
ly conceived of by Jay Coen Gilbert. They are corporations that choose 
to qualify under a certification system that designates them as socially 
responsible to consumers and investors. B Corporations agree to engage 
in “triple bottom line” accounting, focusing on social, environmental, 
and economic returns. Examples of such entities include Ben and Jerry’s, 
Burt’s Bees, and Numi Tea, among others.43 To gain the “B Corporation” 
designation (granted by B Lab), a corporation must be incorporated in a 
state that has a constituency statute allowing directors to consider the 
interests of stakeholders and must amend its articles of incorporation to 
state explicitly that managers must consider the interests of employees, 
the community, and the environment.44 B Corporations must also pay B 
Lab one-tenth of one percent of revenue and score at least 40 out of 100 
                                                 
 43. B Corp Directory, B CORPORATION.NET, http://www.bcorporation.net/community/search 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2011). 
 44. The recommended language for inclusion in a B Corporation’s articles of incorporation 
states: 
In discharging his or her duties, and in determining what is in the best interests of the 
Company and its shareholders, a Director shall consider such factors as the Director 
deems relevant, including, but not limited to, the long-term prospects and interests of the 
Company and its shareholders, and the social, economic, legal, or other effects of any ac-
tion on the current and retired employees, the suppliers and customers of the Company 
and its subsidiaries, and the community and society in which the Company or its subsidi-
aries operate, (collectively, with the shareholders, the “Stakeholders”), together with the 
short-term, as well as long-term, interests of its shareholders and the effect of the Com-
pany’s operations (and its subsidiaries’ operations) on society and the economy of the 
state, the region and the nation. 
Legal Roadmap, B CORPORATION.NET, http://survey.bcorporation.net/become/legal.php (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2011). Also specifically recommended for inclusion is language designed to preempt fidu-
ciary duty claims: 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, any Director is entitled to rely on the definition of “best 
interests” as set forth above in enforcing his or her rights hereunder, and under state law 
and such reliance shall not, absent another breach, be construed as a breach of a Direc-
tor’s fiduciary duty of care, even in the context of a Change in Control Transaction 
where, as a result of weighing other Stakeholders’ interests, a Director determines to ac-
cept an offer, between two competing offers, with a lower price. 
Id. 
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on a survey B Lab administers to rate the corporation’s adherence to so-
cial goals.45 
The hope of B Corporation supporters is that the language in a B 
Corporation’s articles will provide sufficient protection so small busi-
nesses will be less reluctant to take on outside investors for fear that 
those investors will insist on profit-maximization. The danger that a so-
cially driven business may be forced to move away from its social goals 
due to shareholder pressure is demonstrated by the fate of Ben & Jerry’s. 
Known for its socially progressive policies, the company received a 
buyout offer from the Dutch conglomerate Unilever in 2000.46 Founders 
Ben Cohen and Jerry Greenfield resisted the offer and, with other inves-
tors, put together a counteroffer of their own at a lower price.47 Share-
holders of the publicly traded company sued, and corporate law man-
dated that the directors accept the higher offer with the end result that 
Ben & Jerry’s was acquired by Unilever in April 2000 for $326 million.48 
Had Ben & Jerry’s been a B Corporation at the time, it theoretically 
could have relied on that status as an additional defense to the takeover. 
B Corporation advocates received a boost when Maryland became 
the first jurisdiction to legally allow the creation of B Corporations in 
April of 2010.49 Maryland’s law lets businesses commit to a specific 
public good and requires businesses to report on their contributions to 
that goal and submit to auditing of their impact.50 Vermont followed suit 
in May 2010, passing the Vermont Benefit Corporations Act.51 Other 
jurisdictions, including California and Colorado, are considering similar 
legislation. 
While official recognition of B Corporation status is a step forward 
for proponents of the new entity form, significant problems with the use 
of the form remain. The ability to state in articles of incorporation that a 
goal of the company is furthering social good does little to determine 
how that company will be treated under established principles of corpo-
rate law. Questions also remain about the legal implications of the form. 
                                                 
 45. More information on the requirements for becoming a B Corporation is available online. 
See Become a B Corporation, B CORPORATION.NET, http://www.bcorporation.net/become (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2011). 
 46. Hannah Clark, A New Kind of Company, INC., Nov. 29, 2007, at 23, available at 
http://www.inc.com/magazine/20070701/priority-a-new-kind-of-company.html. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. John Tozzi, Maryland Passes ‘Benefit Corp.’ Law for Social Entrepreneurs, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 13, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/running_small_business/ 
archives/2010/04/benefit_corp_bi.html. 
 50. I am unaware of any Maryland corporations that have adopted the B Corporation status to 
date. 
 51. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.01–.14 (2011). 
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For instance, would the suggested language in a B Corporation’s articles 
of incorporation provide it any real legal protection if it is sued by a 
shareholder alleging a breach of directorial fiduciary duty for putting 
stakeholder interest ahead of, or even on par with, shareholder interest? 
If B Corporation status does not alter the underlying concept of share-
holder primacy, that status will not protect B Corporation directors in 
such a situation. The requirement that B Corporations be established in 
jurisdictions that have corporate constituency statutes highlights this un-
certainty, given the weak protection these statutes afford.52  
B Corporation statutes in states such as Maryland and Vermont do 
not explain the impact of granting “for benefit” status on traditional cor-
porate governance concerns. This leaves many questions unanswered. 
Can shareholders of a B Corporation change the law applicable to their 
entity through the recognition of stakeholder interests in their charter 
documents, or must the corporate law of the state in which such an entity 
incorporates be modified to expressly allow such a shift? Is the B Corpo-
ration a likely vehicle for current public corporations, which would have 
to generate sufficient voting support to amend the articles to include B 
Corporation designation? Will a B Corporation incorporated in a juris-
diction that allows directors to consider stakeholder interests be legally 
protected in its business activities in a jurisdiction that does not? 
Practical concerns about B Corporations must also be considered. 
Such corporations will be limited in their access to capital, as investors 
seeking maximum economic returns will direct their money elsewhere. 
Unlike true social businesses, B Corporations are expected to generate 
returns for their investors. Thus, while investors in social businesses do 
not evaluate their investment in a social business in the same pool as 
their investments in return-generating investments, investments in a B 
Corporation would be placed in that pool, and B Corporations might find 
it hard to compete. 
Additionally, it may be difficult to maintain clear focus on the so-
cial goals that constitute part of a B Corporation’s mission because, un-
like with social businesses, those goals are only one part of the reason for 
the being of the entity, not the reason the venture was established in the 
first instance. “Legacy drag” may set in, meaning once the original 
founder of the B Corporation is no longer the driving force behind its 
operations, the focus may change, and the social aspect of the entity may 
lose importance. To the extent B Corporations articulate general state-
ments about their missions and strive to “further community interests,” 
                                                 
 52. See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S NEWEST 
EXPORT 104–05 (2001). 
1516 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:1501 
for example, the goals may become more difficult to define. It may then 
become more challenging to clearly articulate methods of achieving the 
goals, thus presenting opportunity for intra-corporate disagreement. 
Finally, even if B Corporation certification became popular and the 
legal issues were resolved, such entities would still be limited to a “do no 
harm” type of social responsibility. By this I mean that directors of B 
Corporations would be legally entitled to disregard the notion of share-
holder primacy and take other stakeholder interests into account, but they 
would not be legally entitled to ignore shareholder interests. B Corpora-
tion directors may decide not to take a particular action that would be 
profit-maximizing because they conclude that it would harm the envi-
ronment (thereby doing no harm), but they still must be concerned that 
their actions ultimately redound to the benefit of their shareholders. Un-
like the managers of a social business, the managers of a B Corporation 
may not act exclusively to advance a social good. 
2. L3Cs: Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies 
Another recent innovation in business entity form is the L3C, or 
low-profit limited liability company, a variant of the LLC specifically 
intended to allow the entity to pursue social goals. L3Cs are organized in 
the same way as ordinary LLCs but are designated as low-profit organi-
zations with explicit charitable or educational goals. The purported ad-
vantage of using the L3C form is the ability to enable a properly orga-
nized L3C to qualify as a suitable recipient of program related invest-
ment (PRI). In brief, PRI is investment from private grant-making foun-
dations that support socially beneficial activity. PRI at present does not 
provide a significant amount of capital for social enterprise because there 
are severe hurdles. To ensure that an investment qualifies as PRI (and 
thus is appropriate for the foundation to engage in and will count towards 
the required five percent of net worth that foundations must spend each 
year), the foundation must ensure that the investment or loan satisfies 
particular criteria53 and typically must seek assurance from the Internal 
Revenue Service that the investment or loan qualifies. This can be an 
expensive and time-consuming process and prevents the effective use of 
PRI funds for social enterprise investment.54 
                                                 
 53. For example, in making the investment or loan, the foundation (1) must be motivated solely 
by a desire to accomplish its exempt purpose; (2) may not have as a significant motivating factor the 
production of income or the appreciation of property; and (3) must not be engaged in any electio-
neering. See Treas. Reg. §§ 53.4944-3(a)(1)(i)–(iii) (2011). 
 54. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity 
on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 355–58 (2009). 
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To circumvent the problems associated with the current PRI sys-
tem, designers of L3Cs decided to draft legislation that tracked the lan-
guage of the IRS regulations concerning PRI so that if such legislation 
“were adopted, any social enterprise that qualified for L3C status under 
state law would ipso facto qualify for program-related investments under 
the IRS Code.”55 Theoretically, this would enable a foundation that 
wanted to invest in a social enterprise in the form of a PRI to do so with-
out concern that the IRS would disallow the investment as non-qualified. 
The idea of L3Cs received a vote of confidence when legislation 
authorizing their creation was enacted in Vermont in 2008. It has spread 
to other jurisdictions, including Montana and Wyoming, where efforts 
are underway to enact similar legislation.56 Nevertheless, the utility of 
L3Cs remains in doubt. The efficacy of the L3C designation depends on 
the willingness of the IRS to support the idea, and there is currently no 
evidence that it will do so. Given that advance approval from a federal 
tax authority is required to assure that investment in an L3C will be clas-
sified as PRI, it is unlikely that L3C status conferred by a state will serve 
as a proxy for federal approval without IRS action.57 
Despite the advantages that may arise if the IRS takes action to ap-
prove of the L3C designation, at present the designation remains aspira-
tional only and does not provide a certainty for social venturers who wish 
to engage in enterprises that advance social good rather than maximize 
profit. 
IV. SOCIAL BUSINESSES IN ACTION 
There are many legal challenges to the formation of true social 
businesses in the United States. These challenges should not, however, 
prevent entrepreneurs from exploring opportunities. Many ventures that 
seem difficult, or even impossible, can be achieved if visionaries simply 
take action. The law is in a constant state of growth, and development 
can accommodate demands placed upon it by the marketplace. As dis-
cussed above, there is a growing desire on the part of the general public 
and the business community to use corporate power to advance social 
welfare. Rather than wait, entrepreneurs should simply take the advice of 
Professor Yunus of Grameen Bank,58 who said to me when I asked how 
                                                 
 55. Id. at 372–73. 
 56. For updated information about efforts to enact L3C legislation, see Here’s the Latest L3C 
Tally, INTERSECTOR PARTNERS, L3C (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.intersectorl3c.com/l3c_tally.html. 
 57. See Carter G. Bishop, The Low-Profit LLC (L3C): Program Related Investment by Proxy 
or Perversion?, 63 ARK. L. REV. 243, 267 (2010). 
 58. Professor Yunus has credibility in giving this advice as his organization, the Grameen Bank 
of Bangladesh, has several social businesses currently in operation. 
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to convince skeptics to move forward on social businesses, “Tell them to 
just do it.” The following discussion describes some of the many exam-
ples of social businesses in progress. 
A. Type I Social Businesses: Examples From Bangladesh 
1. Grameen/Danone 
A social business is a profit-making, non-dividend-paying entity 
that is formed and operated with the specific intent of addressing an iden-
tified social need.59 The first Type I social business created under the 
aegis of the Grameen Bank was Grameen Danone Foods Limited 
(GDFL), a company registered under the Companies Act (Bangladesh). 
Jointly founded by Groupe Danone and Grameen Bank, GDFL was 
formed with the objective of providing fortified yogurt to undernourished 
children in Bangladesh. The parties entered into a memorandum of un-
derstanding (MOU) in March 2006 pursuant to which one half of the to-
tal amount of approximately $1.1 million start-up funds would be pro-
vided by Danone and a group of four Grameen companies.60 The mission 
statement of the MOU stated expressly that Groupe Danone Foods was 
to be a social business with the mission of reducing poverty and bringing 
daily nutrition to the poor with the aim of sharing the benefits with its 
community of stakeholders. The MOU called for Grameen Danone to 
design a manufacturing and distribution model that involved local com-
munities; this would include sourcing supply from local farmers, hiring 
local populations to staff the manufacturing plant, and contributing to the 
creation of jobs.61 The MOU further stated that the business was to be 
run to incur no losses and to generate a small profit. That profit was to be 
used to repay the initial investments of Danone and the Grameen compa-
nies as soon as possible.62 In a deviation from the pure no-loss, no-
dividend model of a social business, the parties agreed to pay a one-
percent dividend “as a way of publicly recognizing the ownership of 
[the] company and to make it possible for Danone to show a figure in the 
appropriate line of its balance sheet.”63 After repayment of the initial in-
vestments, all future profits were to be reinvested in the venture to ex-
pand and improve its operations. 
                                                 
 59. See discussion supra Part II (description of the basic characteristics of social businesses). 
 60. YUNUS, supra note 23, at 144. 
 61. Id. at 144–45. 
 62. Id. at 138. 
 63. Id. Mohammad Yunus notes “Now, in hindsight and with further thought, I am in favor of 
removing the dividend clause . . . . If Danone agrees, we’ll do that, to make it match with the defini-
tion of social business as . . . a non-loss, non-dividend business.” Id. 
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Grameen Danone Foods opened its first yogurt plant in Bogra, 
Bangladesh, in March 2008. The facility aims to produce 3,000 tons of 
highly nutritious yogurt64 per year from milk supplied by 300 micro 
farms that were established with credit from Grameen Bank. When the 
plant opened, Grameen also announced that it would provide additional 
financing to expand capacity at the Bogra plant and to open a second fa-
cility near Dhaka.65 The yogurt is to be sold at a low cost in the rural vil-
lages of Bangladesh where populations would otherwise face malnutri-
tion issues, and at a higher cost in the more affluent areas of the country, 
such that the higher cost sales subsidize operation. 
Like any business, GDFL confronted many start-up challenges. It 
encountered problems in the preservation of the yogurt throughout the 
distribution process. The shelf life of the product was relatively short, 
and there is little, if any, refrigeration capacity in parts of the target dis-
tribution areas. In addition, the original labor structure proved unworka-
ble. The yogurt was originally delivered from the plant to rural villages 
in “baby taxis” (essentially motorized golf carts) and was then picked up 
and sold by local “yogurt ladies.” This model imposed unworkable costs 
because the salaries demanded by the baby taxi drivers were too high, 
and the local culture in the villages caused the yogurt ladies to “hire” 
friends and relatives to assist in distribution and then demand that each 
“helper” receive the same set daily salary paid to the true employee.66 
GDFL took steps to address these issues, including changing the 
method of delivery of the product from baby taxi to rickshaw and putting 
the yogurt ladies on commission rather than salary, but the issues de-
pressed the returns generated by the venture. After its first year of opera-
tions, GDFL was having trouble generating enough profits to cover costs, 
an essential attribute of a successful social business. This is not to sug-
gest that GDFL will not succeed in the long term. It is not unusual for 
firms to flounder at their inception and then overcome their problems and 
become profitable. If anything, it demonstrates that social businesses 
face the same challenges, and present the same opportunities for success, 
as traditional ventures. 
                                                 
 64. For more details on the operations of the enterprise, see id. at 129–47. See also, Sheridan 
Prasso, Saving The World One Cup of Yogurt at a Time, FORTUNE, Feb. 19, 2007, at 96; Carol Mat-
lack, Danone Innovates to Help Feed the Poor, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 28, 2008, 2:08 
PM), http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/apr2008/gb20080428_971498.htm. 
 65. Danone Plans to Open Second Yogurt Plant in Bangladesh, ECON. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2008, 
2:17 AM), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/latest-news/danone-plans-to-open-second-yogurt-
plant-in-bangladesh/articleshow/2996720.cms. 
 66. See generally, Asad Kamran Ghalib & Farhad Hossain, Social Business Enterprises—
Maximising Social Benefits or Maximising Profits? The Case of Grameen-Danone Foods Limited 
(Brooks World Poverty Inst., Working Paper No. 51, 2008) (a full accounting of GDFL and its 
struggles). 
1520 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:1501 
2. Grameen Veolia 
Another Type I social business involving the joint efforts of Gra-
meen Bank and a large corporation is Veolia Water.67 As with Grameen 
Danone, Veolia Water was conceived to address a serious social problem 
facing Bangladesh: the fact that much of the water available in rural 
Bangladesh is contaminated with arsenic and is therefore not safe to 
drink.68 Despite efforts by the World Bank and others to remedy the situ-
ation,69 the problem has persisted. In 2007, Veolia Water entered into a 
MOU with Grameen Healthcare (a part of the Grameen family of com-
panies) to provide safe and affordable drinking water to rural populations 
of Bangladesh. The original business plan did not call for the sort of 
cross-subsidization (in the form of two-tiered pricing) used by Grameen 
Danone Foods. Instead, the goal was to be able to provide affordable wa-
ter by, among other things, subsidizing its distribution through the sale of 
electrical services (which Veolia Water also provides), streamlining the 
distribution process, and allowing the use of microcredit to pay for water 
supplies.70 
As with Grameen Danone Foods, the water venture encountered 
challenges from the outset. Although the technical aspects of the project 
went smoothly—a treatment plant with connected pipes and tap points 
was built and brought into operation—the consumption side of the 
process did not go according to plan. The venture encountered difficul-
ties that were both economic and social. The price set by the venture in-
itially was targeted to be one taka per liter (approximately 1.4 cents) if 
purchased at the treatment plant. That cost could not be offered system-
wide due to the additional costs associated with distribution. Believing 
that villagers would not be willing to pay different prices for water based 
solely on where they received it, Grameen Veolia Water decided to 
charge three taka for ten liters at all distribution sites. This higher price 
discouraged sales and contributed to the fact that initially only ten to fif-
                                                 
 67. Veolia Water is part of a larger entity, Veolia Environment, which operates waste man-
agement, energy, public transport, and water systems. MUHAMMAD YUNUS & KARL WEBER, 
BUILDING SOCIAL BUSINESS: THE NEW KIND OF CAPITALISM THAT SERVES HUMANITY’S MOST 
PRESSING NEEDS 135 (2010). 
 68. For a discussion by the World Health Organization of the problems caused by arsenic in 
drinking water in Bangladesh and elsewhere, see Allan H. Smith et al., Contamination of Drinking 
Water by Arsenic in Bangladesh: A Public Health Emergency, 78 BULL. OF WORLD HEALTH ORG. 9, 
1093 (2000), available at http://www.who.int/bulletin/archives/volume78_9/en/index.html. 
 69. The problem of unsafe water draws significant international interest. The United Nations 
calls for remediation of the problem in Millennium Goal 7. Specifically, Target 7.C states a goal to 
“[h]alve, by 2015, the proportion of the population without sustainable access to safe drinking water 
and basic sanitation.” We Can End Poverty 2015: Millennium Development Goals, UNITED 
NATIONS, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/environ.shtml (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
 70. See YUNUS & WEBER, supra note 67, at 141–42. 
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teen percent of the target population participated. Perhaps more signifi-
cant than the pricing problem were the social issues confronted by the 
venture. The populations the project was intended to serve generally 
were not accustomed to paying for water. Further, they did not grasp the 
severity of the health risk posed by drinking arsenic-contaminated water, 
as the dangers posed are long-term, not immediate.71 
The venture continues to look for solutions to these problems. One 
idea is to alter the business model to include cross-subsidization. Be-
cause the production capacity of the treatment plant far outpaced the de-
mand for water at the price of three taka per ten liters, the venture de-
cided to bottle some of the excess water and sell it to institutional buyers 
at a higher cost, using the profits to subsidize the rural sales. Additional-
ly, the venture decided to experiment with providing direct in-home wa-
ter service to those villagers who could afford it—again using the profits 
generated from such sales to subsidize sales to less affluent villagers. The 
venture is still very much a work in progress and faces ongoing chal-
lenges. 
3. Grameen GC Eye Care Hospital 
In 2001, Grameen Bank established the Prevention Blindness 
Project to address the issue of blindness in Bangladesh. The venture be-
came the Grameen GC Eye Care Hospital, which is run as a social busi-
ness in Bogra, Bangladesh. A second Eye Care Hospital opened in Baris-
al, Bangladesh, in 2009 and two more such hospitals are planned. The 
mission of the hospitals (run under the umbrella of Grameen Healthcare) 
is: 
[To] design and develop a bottoms-up Healthcare infrastructure that 
can take lessons from successful efforts around the world and im-
prove upon them to deliver the highest quality Healthcare, in an ef-
ficient and sustainable manner, primarily to the poorest of the poor 
but also to the non poor, who may pay a little more than the target 
population.72 
Grameen GC Eye Hospital is run on a cost-subsidy basis. Fifty per-
cent of patients pay a subsidized amount, forty percent pay a premium 
amount, and ten percent are treated for free—and may have a subsidy 
paid to their family for the time they are out of work due to the surgery. 
                                                 
 71. As Mr. Yunus nicely puts it, many think “this water may make me sick in twenty years. 
But who knows? In twenty years I might be dead anyway. So why worry about it?” Id. at 146. Fur-
ther, he accurately notes that this is not unlike affluent people who drink, smoke, and overeat. Id. 
 72. The Mission, GRAMEEN HEALTHCARE TRUST, http://www.grameenhealth.org/ (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2011). 
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Each patient fills out a simple questionnaire to determine the amount 
owed. The model has worked so well that the Eye Hospital has generated 
profits (the sign of a successful social business) that it is using to build a 
new floor for training. 
The key to the success of the Eye Care Hospital is that it delivers 
high-quality care at an affordable cost in high volume, and it has highly 
trained technicians doing most of the examination and preparation work 
so that the ophthalmologists can focus on the operation. It also stresses 
efficiency at every turn to keep costs as low as possible. This effort even 
reaches the grounds of the facility where there is a vegetable garden ge-
nerating funds through the sale of its produce (and thereby paying the 
salary of the gardener). 
The success of the Grameen GC Eye Care Hospitals demonstrates 
that social businesses can achieve self-sufficiency while providing social 
benefit. Unlike a charity, the venture is not dependent on external fund-
ing and, unlike a traditional business, it is free to concentrate on further-
ing its identified social goal rather than maximizing profit for its share-
holders. The Grameen GC Eye Care Hospital has a model that other so-
cial businesses can emulate. 
B. Type II Social Businesses: Works in Operation and in Progress 
A different model of a social business is a Type II social business. 
Unlike the Type I social businesses discussed thus far, which produce a 
product intended to address a social concern, a Type II social business 
produces a product for general market consumption and addresses a so-
cial need by hiring poor or otherwise disadvantaged populations to oper-
ate the business. The entity may be owned by the population it is in-
tended to serve, or it may be owned by a trust that is dedicated to using 
its profits for the same end. Given the complexities of ownership by the 
beneficiary population,73 it is more likely that the ownership will be 
through a trust. 
1. Grameen Fisheries Foundation 
Grameen Bank created Grameen Fisheries Foundation (GMF) as a 
nonprofit organization in 1994 to mitigate poverty through aquaculture 
and fisheries activities. It expanded functions and activities in the year 
2000 to integrate livestock and dairy development activities through the 
Community Livestock and Dairy Development Project. This was a joint 
                                                 
 73. It is not impossible to structure a social business that is owned by its beneficiary popula-
tion. An outstanding example of one is the Grameen Bank, which is owned by the population that 
borrows from it. 
2011] Berle and Social Businesses: A Consideration 1523 
project with the Bangladesh Ministry of Finance and received funding 
from the United Nations Development Program. The venture was regis-
tered with the joint stock companies of the Government of Bangladesh in 
2003. 
GMF is a Type II venture—it seeks to organize the local people liv-
ing on the banks of ponds or their close vicinity who are otherwise un-
employed or hiring themselves out as day laborers. GMF formed the vil-
lagers into groups consisting of five beneficiaries each. GMF then 
trained six to eight of the beneficiary groups in aquaculture, rural devel-
opment, and social development activities. The groups also were given 
all inputs, including: fry, fertilizers, manure, feeds, ice, nets, and boats. 
The venture took over derelict fishery pools and, so far, has brought 
636 out of 808 ponds under its control. The fish are sold in ordinary 
market transactions and any net profits are used to expand the operations 
so that more employees can be hired. The fisheries project demonstrates 
the second type of a social business. It is run like any for-profit venture 
but has stated a goal of hiring disadvantaged populations. Although the 
fisheries project did not begin life as a social business (it was first a non-
profit), it shows the capacity of nonprofits to evolve and free themselves 
from dependence on external (and uncertain) funding sources. 
2. Women’s Bean Project 
There are many entities that show potential to fully operate as a 
Type II social business, although they are not yet fully self-sufficient. 
One example is the Women’s Bean Project, based in Denver, Colorado 
(Women’s Bean). Women’s Bean is organized and currently operates as 
a 501(c)(3) nonprofit entity, but it shows that such entities have the ca-
pacity to evolve into Type II social businesses using only revenues to 
fund operations. 
Women’s Bean began as a job and life training skills program for 
women (many of whom are felons or past substance abusers) who could 
not otherwise find employment. The women produce a variety of prod-
ucts for sale, including a wide line of foodstuffs and, as of recent years, 
handcrafted jewelry. Although Women’s Bean initially relied heavily on 
grants and outside funding (and thus was established as a 501(c)(3)), as 
of mid-2010, the venture generated approximately seventy-six percent of 
its revenue from sales of its products.74 It uses revenues to expand prod-
uct lines and to increase the number of women who can participate in the 
program. At the conclusion of each woman’s term in the program, she is 
placed at a job in the local community. 
                                                 
 74. Interview with Tamara Ryan, CEO, Women’s Bean. 
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Unlike many nonprofits, the venture is run like a business. It has a 
professional CEO who has been in office for approximately seven years 
and has overseen significant revenue growth. The entity is overseen by a 
nineteen-member board that provides business and other expertise, 
another distinction from many typical nonprofit entities. 
If Woman’s Bean can increase its revenue such that it is capable of 
covering one hundred percent of its expenses through its operations, it 
will be a true social business and will be able to end its reliance on exter-
nal, and unreliable, funding sources. Given that the access to reliable 
sources of external capital is cited by the CEO of Women’s Bean as the 
largest hurdle facing the venture, removing the need to rely on external 
capital would be significant. This example highlights an advantage of 
operating as a social business rather than as a nonprofit.75 
V. CONCLUSION 
When Berle and Means examined business entities in the early 
1930s, they saw changed institutions in which widely dispersed owners 
had little or no say over how their capital was used. They therefore fo-
cused their attention, in part, on how to solve the problems caused by this 
separation of ownership and control. Berle’s belief that corporate manag-
ers’ power should be exercised “only for the ratable benefit of all the 
shareholders as their interest appears”76 is the basis for the shareholder 
primacy theory of corporate governance. Although Berle later moderated 
his position on shareholder primacy,77 the idea that shareholder interests 
should be paramount in determining appropriate corporate behavior con-
tinues to dominate U.S. law. 
But stopping with the notion of shareholder primacy shortchanges 
Berle’s insights. Berle understood that corporations were radically 
changed entities that exercised great power, and he was concerned with 
how that power should be used. Berle’s perception that corporations ex-
ercise great economic, political, and social power has become truer over 
time. Social businesses are a means of acknowledging that businesses 
have gained power and, therefore, responsibility. This entity form allows 
the operation of ventures that begin to answer to the “development of 
social pressure [that] demand[s] that the power shall be used for the ben-
                                                 
 75. Of course, revenues would have to increase sufficiently to offset the loss of tax breaks that 
would occur if Women’s Bean abandoned its nonprofit status. This suggests that social businesses 
should perhaps be eligible for preferential tax treatment. This issue is worthy of more consideration 
than it will receive here. 
 76. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 220. 
 77. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Ori-
gins: Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 135, 147, 149 (2008). 
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efit of all concerned.”78 Social businesses allow “a convincing system of 
community obligations”79 to be identified and enable the power of the 
business model to be brought to address those obligations. While not 
every business can or should operate as a social business, those that do 
justify an expansion of our corporate universe and support a shift away 
from the strict shareholder primacy model. Berle identified important 
changes in the ways businesses operated in his time and considered how 
those changes should be accommodated. We can now do the same and 
enable the development of social businesses. 
                                                 
 78. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 310. 
 79. Id. at 312. 
